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Rape, and Other Sexual Assaults: Towards a Philosophical Analysis
Abstract
Philosophers have identified the harm involved in stranger rape in various ways. This article reviews
these with a view to making sense of surveys on date and acquaintance rape and minor sexual assaults:
how much should these be bracketed with stranger rape as a major and traumatic violation? Or are some
of these incidents closer to bad manners? It concludes that rape is a violation of autonomy that should be
condemned because of the extreme unhappiness caused to the victim. It is argued that this criterion can
be used to make sense of lesser sexual assaults whereas some of the other criteria philosophers have used
to condemn rape tend to bifurcate sexual experiences into acceptable on the one hand and seriously
traumatic on the other, with little space in between.
I. Rape: the need for a philosophical analysis
Rape has not been extensively discussed by philosophers. The general assumption has been that
rape is plainly morally abhorrent, so that there is little scope for debate. The two main issues
considered have been exactly how rape should be defined, and how the evil involved in rape should
be categorized.1 I fully accept that rape is morally abhorrent, but argue in what follows that there
are good reasons for reconsidering both these issues. In recent years, particularly in the United
States and Canada, but also in the UK to some extent, it has been argued on the basis of survey
evidence that rape is vastly more extensive than would be thought from official statistics. Thus in
England and Wales there are currently some 400-450 convictions for rape each year, arguably a
scandalously low figure given that some 6,000 plus women go to police stations, complain of rape,
and are believed by the police to have suffered a sexual assault. Using British and American survey
evidence, projections of the number of cases of rape and attempted rape in England and Wales vary
from 115,000 to 270,000 each year.2 The enormous gap between either of the official figures and
the projections raises acutely the question of whether the surveys are actually looking at the same
phenomenon: are they in some way taking lesser events such as changes of mind or episodes of
‘bad sex’ and transforming them into rape? Instead of looking at a highly traumatic experience
suffered by a tiny minority of women, the surveys suggest that perhaps one woman in four has been
the victim of rape or attempted rape. The issue becomes more acute when we consider two other
survey findings. One is that lesser sexual assaults are also very common. Thus in summarizing her
survey of 6159 US undergraduates Mary Koss concludes that if we include her category of
‘unwanted sexual touching’ ‘[o]nly 45.6% of the young women polled by the study had never
experienced sexual victimization’.3 The other is that men, too, are the victims of forced
heterosexual sex. Legal definitions of rape normally assume a male perpetrator, but if we accept for
the minute that heterosexual sex forced on a man (using the same criteria of ‘force’, broadly, as
those Mary Koss uses for women) is rape, then 8% of the men in one survey had been victims of
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rape on a date, which compares with 8.5% of the women Mary Koss studied.4
By this stage the reader is liable to feel that things are getting out of hand. From legitimate feminist
outrage that so many of the British perpetrators of the 6,000 or so rapes reported to police stations
get off we are moving to a situation where at least half the female population have suffered sexual
assaults,5 and men perhaps do not lag far behind them. One obvious response is methodological
rather than philosophical: it is to ask whether the way the people in the surveys of sexual assault are
chosen or the questions they are asked, or the way their answers are interpreted, are producing
inflated figures.6 The other, which starts with the definition of rape and tries to work out how the
phenomena uncovered by the surveys relate to it, is the one to be taken here.
The starting point of most discussions of rape is naturally the legal definition of it. In England and
Wales rape is an offence which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (Section I (1),
Sexual Offenses Act 1956, plus s. 37, Schedule 2). The Sexual Offenses (Amendment) Act, 1976,
as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, s. 142, states that a man commits
rape if:
a. He has sexual intercourse with a person (whether vaginal or anal) who
at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and
b. at the time he knows the person does not consent to the intercourse or is reckless
as to whether that person consents to it.
Thus under current English law rape is perpetrated by definition by a man, and the victim can be
male or female. The test for whether or not intercourse is rape is consent, and the law does not lay
down how consent or non-consent is to be established. Obviously almost all features of this
definition can and have been challenged: the English and Welsh definition of rape was extended to
include anal sex with men or women in 1994; some past legal definitions in the USA laid down
criteria for resistance, e.g., ‘to the utmost’ to establish non-consent; clause b. enshrines the
notorious Morgan judgement, etc.7
II. Rape as a Moral Category
The focus of this article is, however, on rape as a moral rather than a legal category. This is not
because the issue of rape generates moral issues similar to those raised by abortion or euthanasia,
where there is substantial debate as to whether the law is seriously out of line with morality. I have
not run across any philosophical claims that rape is acceptable in some circumstances. However,
there are three important reasons for treating rape as a moral issue.
First, it allows us to discuss the seriousness of particular acts without trying to put matters into
legal terminology, or to consider the - perhaps unintended - effects of legislative proposals. If, for
example, it seems desirable on moral grounds to see rape less as an absolute ‘either it is rape or it
isn’t’ type of offence and more as a series of gradations from a very serious interference with
another person through to bad manners, that could be reflected in English law either by rewriting
the law on rape on the lines first carried out in Michigan, and having a graded series of sexual
assaults in which the word ‘rape’ is never mentioned, or by tacking this idea on to the existing
English law of rape together with the English law on procurement. Either of these approaches could
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produce much the same effects, but each would have its own legal advantages and drawbacks to do
with the way it fitted into the rest of English law.8 Alternatively, consider the view that the worst
cases of rape are as bad as murder. This was evidently held in some southern states of the USA,
which therefore imposed the death penalty for rape up to the 1960s. Even if the moral basis of this
view is acceptable, the practical effect in court was that juries were very reluctant to convict rapists,
who therefore tended to be put on probation for minor offences rather than executed, the main
exception being black men accused of raping white women. There would thus be a good case for
someone who held that rapists morally deserve to die actually advocating a lesser penalty in order
to secure convictions. It makes sense in an initial approach to get away from these complications
and focus on a moral account.
Second, as a practical matter, the use of imprisonment to punish rape and attempted rape on the
scale which would be required if the survey evidence is taken at face value would cause enormous
social disruption, tripling the British prison population, criminalising a good proportion of (mainly
young) men and requiring a British Gulag.9 Thus the obvious role for legal change would be as an
encouragement to moral change, and there is thus much scope for moral discussion and education.
Third, rape is so plainly morally abhorrent that philosophers and others have tended to use
something of a scattergun approach in listing reasons why it is wrong, and a consistent and
carefully-thought-out account is a good basis for considering how extensive should be the range of
acts covered by our abhorrence of rape.
In what follows I want to focus initially, then, on the wrong done by a stranger rapist. There are two
main issues that need to be considered. The first is the definition of the wrongful act, the second is
the nature of the harm inflicted.
On the first question I am happy to accept the arguments of J.H. Bogart, who argues that rape is
nonconsensual sex. He reaches this conclusion by considering defining rape as forcible, coerced,
nonvoluntary and nonconsensual sex. He argues that only the last of these covers the five main
categories which should be included in the ‘core domain of rape’, these being: sex obtained by force
or threat of force against the victim; sex obtained by threats against a third party; sex while the
victim is incapacitated; sex obtained by fraud, and sex involving a child. The last of these is
covered in Britain by legislation on under-age sex, where the penalties for more extreme cases are
similar to those for rape. English law thus fits well with Bogart’s basic argument, which is that
children are incapable of consent to sex, even though they may appear to be voluntarily
participating without force or coercion. At the other end of the list, sex obtained by force is
nonconsensual as well as forcible, coerced and non-voluntary. Bogart seems to me to have captured
the sense behind English law and the better US laws that the minimum definition of rape is that it is
sex without the consent of the victim.10 This is a simple definition which requires less
supplementation than alternatives and effectively captures the central idea of what rape comprises.
The main problem that it does not solve is what exactly counts as consent or non-consent, but this
seems to me to be an inevitably problematic issue that this definition appropriately highlights.11
Some feminists take the view that rape should be seen as against the victim’s will rather than
without her consent, because consent is a very passive concept.12 We should, they argue, be
advocating sex where the active will of the woman involved is seen as central. I am happy to agree
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with this view as an account of the sort of sex that should be encouraged. However, a woman who
genuinely consents to entirely passive sex, if such a thing is possible, does not seem to be
consenting to rape. Further, children who are able to do things voluntarily, but who are too young
to fully understand the meaning of sexual consent are not clearly protected if the concept of will is
made central.13 There is also the problem of a woman who is unconscious. Unless she has
previously stated that she does not want sex while unconscious, a man who has sex with her is not
violating her will, which she is incapable of expressing, but he has emphatically not obtained her
consent. Thus at minimum a definition based on will requires two forms of supplementation which
are not needed by a definition centered on consent.
III. The Harm of Rape
Moving on to the second question, what is the harm inflicted by having sex without consent? There
are several possible answers here. They plainly overlap, and there is, of course, nothing to stop
several answers being simultaneously right. Here are some suggestions.
Rape violates the autonomy of the victim. She is denied the right to determine an
important area of her life. Alternatively, she is treated as merely a means for the rapist.14
Rape violates a person’s sexual self-determination. Sexuality is an important area in the
formation of an individual’s personality.
An individual has a right to control his or her own body (or a right to bodily integrity).
Rape violates that right.
Rape alienates an important aspect of a person, reducing her to a fragment of her
being.15
Rape violates an important part of a person’s domain.16
Rape causes unhappiness to the victim and others for no justifiable reason.17
Before proceeding I want to consider the case of the Mineral Water Fanatic (MWF). This example
appears frivolous in such a serious context, but is intended to prove a serious point. The MWF is a
hypothetical figure who is convinced everyone should try noncarbonated mineral water. He forces
his victims to swallow a mouthful of mineral water. He has also been known to hold his victims
down for brief periods, and to hide behind them.18 He thus violates their bodily integrity and
autonomy, and uses another as a thing to conceal himself, alienating aspects of the person’s
personality. There is no doubt that the actions of the MWF are morally blameworthy, but despite
the apparent verbal similarity between what he does and some of the above moral descriptions of
rape, few would regard him as guilty of acts approaching murder in their seriousness. We thus seem
to be pointed away from autonomy and bodily integrity as reasons for finding rape morally
abhorrent, and pointed towards the denial of sexual self-determination and the causing of
unhappiness.
Bearing the MWF in mind, let us review the list of reasons why rape is wrong more carefully.
Starting with autonomy, there is no question that rape denies a person’s autonomy. So, however,
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does forcing someone to swallow a mouthful of water, holding someone down briefly, or making
them stand still so someone else can hide behind them. So also, as Bogart points out, does a labor
contract: it involves someone sacrificing some of her autonomy in exchange for money.19 There are
two problems with autonomy on its own. First, some violations of a person’s autonomy are
justifiable. Some restrictions on libelous utterances, for example, are seen as a legitimate violation
of free speech because the unwarranted harm done to the libel victim outweighs the right to
autonomy enshrined in the defense of free speech. By itself this problem is not serious, because the
violation of autonomy in instances of rape is grave, whilst the justification for it is slight. This
leads us on to the second problem. Why is rape seen as a grave violation of autonomy? The main
explanations are that sexuality is central to the personality, and that this particular violation causes
great distress. Autonomy does not appear to be a good reason independently of these other two.
We shall return to sexual self-determination. What about the right to control one’s own body? The
same problems apply to this idea as to that of autonomy. I am not sure that we have an absolute
right to control our own bodies. If I am holding on to a friend to stop him from falling from a great
height it is debatable whether I have a right to let go of him in order to scratch my nose. Again the
heart of the problem is that of the sexual parts of one’s body, their central role in the claimed right
of control, and of the distress caused by sexual violation.
The idea of alienation involves a claim that in some sense I own my person and personality, and
that some state or states of this person are acceptable or natural or ideal, whilst other states are
alienated. We thus add to the problems involved in the idea of autonomy the difficulty of showing
that a certain state is ideal or natural or proper. Human beings are very heavily involved in various
cultures and it is difficult to decide what is natural or proper. One possibility, of course, is to say
that the individual decides what is natural or proper for her, but this then makes the idea of
alienation redundant and replaces it with autonomy.
Shafer and Frye’s idea that rape violates a person’s domain involves the assertion that a domain is a
person (a behaving body) and the space it occupies. The activities, tools and materials the person
needs to carry out her goals are included, as are the ‘resources of its work, play, recreation,
exercise, solace and amusement’. Bending someone’s will, dulling her intelligence or affecting her
sense of identity ‘comes very near the center of her domain’. The idea of a domain is thus another
way of stating that individuals have right to autonomy. As Shafer and Frye then acknowledge,
people’s rights to autonomy may conflict, in which case ‘it seems only reasonable to concede the
power of consent in a conflict over a given item to the person to whose domain it is more central -
that is, to the one more profoundly affected by it’.20 As with the claim about autonomy, this claim
about persons’ domains says something important about rape if it is accepted that sexual self-
determination is very close to the center of someone’s domain.21 Perhaps one could hold that it is
just obvious that this is the case, but a better move is to say that sexual self-determination is very
central because violating it causes great distress, whereas the bodily violations carried out by the
MWF are much less significant. Although my argument is now moving towards looking at the evil
consequences of particular denials of sexual self-determination, it needs to be stressed that the
denial of autonomy does remain in the background. People can decide to put themselves through
dangerous and painful experiences (e.g. donating a kidney to someone else), and our willingness to
do this on occasion where necessary is part of what makes us moral agents. What follows should
thus be seen as placing heavy stress on the consequences of one sort of denial of autonomy.
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Our more detailed discussion of the list of evils involved in rape thus points in the same direction
as our discussion of the MWF: the other evils seem to be premised on assertions about sexual self-
determination backed up by the evidence about the distress caused by the violation of sexual self-
determination. This latter point seems to me to be crucial: if violating sexual self-determination
never did anyone any obvious harm, then rape would surely not be seen as any more harmful than
the minor interference involved in, say, pressing a leaflet advocating a particular point of view into
someone’s hand, or causing someone to slow down a very little when driving. We thus have a
basically a rule utilitarian view of rape: it is evil because any benefit to the rapist is vastly
outweighed by the typical consequences of rape.22
Bogart discusses and rejects the idea that an experiential element is intrinsic to the harm of rape.
The experience of victims varies, he says: there is no common experience.23 I am sure that the
experience varies, but moral condemnation should be concerned with typical or frequent
experiences. If some women are unaffected and others suicidal following rape, whilst substantial
disturbance is typical, then rape is about as blameworthy as other acts which cause substantial
disturbance on average.
A consequence of my approach here is that rape has a cultural and material element to it: it is more
wrong for some women in some cultures than for others. In our mainstream British or US culture,
for example, a raped woman is not seen as inherently unmarriageable, although her sexual
relationships will very likely be disrupted. To that extent, then, rape is less serious for us than for
people who have that belief. Rape victims in modern western countries are typically offered
abortions if necessary. It is obviously traumatic to put a woman in the situation of having to make
decisions about abortion, but arguably somewhat less traumatic than leaving her with no choice and
an unwanted child. Going in the other direction, rape victims today have some fear of AIDS, which
was absent some years ago and may perhaps become less of a fear in the future.24
The evil consequences of stranger rape in modern western societies have been well charted by anti-
rape activists and experts. Many victims suffer a version of post-traumatic stress disorder involving
anger, depression, sleeplessness and flashbacks. Victims frequently break up with existing partners,
leave their jobs, move house, move to another location. Their sexual functioning is often disrupted.
Obviously the disruptions I have listed involve economic as well as psychological costs; for
American victims the economic costs may include medical expenses. There is some uncertainty in
the literature about how long the effects last, but they can clearly last a very long time, making it
hard to claim that a particular woman has fully recovered or become a ‘survivor’ rather than a
victim.25 We are clearly dealing with a very serious violation.
The above list covers the main consequences for the individual victim, but the evils caused by
stranger rape are more extensive. Rape is very widely feared by women. One survey suggests that
violent stranger rape is the crime most feared by American women.26 Women are generally more
afraid of crime than men, and it seems that much of the reason for this is that they are afraid of
sexual assault as an aspect of their fear of other crimes. One of the evils of rape is thus the
generation of fear in women who are afraid they might become victims.27
A closely-related evil is the restrictions which fear of rape places on women’s movements and
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activities. There are a whole series of issues to do with control of the streets after dark, public
transport, the design of urban spaces, which are generated by (mainly women’s) fear of crime. If
this fear means that women to some extent lose work and educational opportunities, leisure
activities and the chance of participating in political activities, then rapists are restricting the
benefits available to half the population as well as generating fear.28
IV. ‘Rapettes’, Gropes and Male Victims
If my arguments above are accepted we now have a principle with which to attempt to make sense
of the results of the surveys discussed in the first section of this article. The more nonconsenting
sexual acts resemble rape in the sense that they typically produce similar consequences, the more
they should be assimilated to the category of rape.
How does this criterion match up with the survey evidence? To start with, it is necessary to say
something about consent. More recent surveys have identified a form of unwilling sex that is
familiar to most people, namely ‘altruistic’ sex undertaken in order to keep a partner happy. Most
people's experience of this seems to be positive. There is obviously a problem in identifying this
form of sex, because it needs to be distinguished from sex that is undertaken because of implied
threats of violence. It is difficult to identify an implied threat because it is a matter of judgment
exactly what someone would have done had the woman in question refused. However, many
couples seem to be able to identify clear episodes of sex which is intended to maintain the
relationship and which it would be stretching the language to describe as rape. There is that least a
possibility that the responses to some survey questions that were asked about unwanted sex
misinterpreted unwanted but consenting sex into rape.
Some indication of how such a misinterpretation could arise is offered by a survey conducted by
Hannon et. al., which found that 63.6% of the women they surveyed had experienced unwanted sex
on a date. However, when asked what behaviors they had engaged in on dates where this had
occurred, 62% of women willingly kissed with tongue contact, 23% had their breasts touched
directly by the man, 10% touched the man’s genitals, 5% willingly had sex (i.e., presumably they
did not want to have sex a second or third time). In other words, although some of what Hannon et.
al. discovered was sexual coercion, many of the women surveyed were keeping an aroused partner
happy. They were not so much alienating an important aspect of their person as missing something
good on television whilst having a fairly pleasurable experience.29
A related question concerns the way in which women who were identified by investigators such as
Mary Koss as victims of rape did not identify themselves as victims. This is a fraught issue. On the
one hand, it is possible for women who have a pretty clearly been victims of rape not to identify
their experience in that way. For example, where spousal rape has only recently been accepted by
the law, women may perhaps identify the experience as seriously traumatic, but not to be willing to
call it rape. On the other hand, there is a strong tradition in the feminist research which objects to
the substitution of the views of experts for the experiences of women. About a quarter of the women
who Koss identified as raped on the basis of her Ms survey of 6,159 students said in the
questionnaire that they did not feel victimized, and some three-quarters did not recognize their
experience as rape.30 In a series of articles and responses Gilbert accuses Koss of describing women
who were not victimized as victims, whilst Koss provides various explanations of the apparent
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discrepancy.31 Much of the discussion concerns interpretations of the use of alcohol, and raises
methodological rather than philosophical issues, but Koss’s vigorous assertion that the students who
she considers have been raped are the victims of real rapes and not some less serious ‘rapettes’
raises a further issue.
A woman who reports a stranger rape to a police station and who subsequently endures a rape trial
plainly recognizes that she has been raped, and, as we have seen, there is ample evidence that the
event is profoundly traumatic. There is also good evidence that acquaintance rape produces effects
similar to stranger rape: the sheer terror of the event tends to be less but the effect on the woman’s
ability to trust other people is worse.32 The acquaintance rapes which are used in evidence of this
are ones reported to rape crisis centers – again, the woman involved plainly recognizes she has
undergone a traumatic experience. Many of the women discussed in surveys such as Koss’s do not
tell anyone, a quarter of them do not feel victimized, and only about a quarter describe their
experience as ‘rape’. Hence Mary Koss’s need to repudiate the allegation that she is largely
describing ‘rapettes’. However, the evidence of the extent to which the women concerned are
traumatized is largely lacking: there is one small survey of women who are deemed, using
questions similar to Koss’s, to have undergone rape, which suggests that they experience greater
depression, but it is on such a small scale that it would be unwise to draw wider conclusions from
it.33 Using the criteria drawn from the above philosophical analysis, then, there has to be an open
verdict on some of what Koss uncovered: consenting but unwilling sex, rapettes or rapes. There
would, however, be a clear criterion for further investigations.
The same conclusion applies with even greater force to Koss’s ‘unwanted sexual touching’: there
seems to be virtually no evidence as to whether the experience of unwanted kisses, fondling etc. is
traumatic in any sense. This is particularly worrying, as the predominant model of a move towards
greater sexual intimacy seems to be that the man puts his arm round the woman’s shoulder, holds
her hand, kisses her etc., and she either fends him off or goes along with it.34 Provided that men
once fended off remain fended off this seems to be a harmless way to proceed, but it is bound to
result in most women experiencing unwanted sexual contact of various sorts. To the extent that
female initiation of sexual intimacy has become more common there will be increasingly large
numbers of men who also experience unwanted sexual contact.35
This problem relates to Koss’s finding of a high rate of attempted rape. One question she used for
this purpose was: ‘Have you had a man attempt sexual intercourse (get on top of you, insert his
penis) when you didn’t want to by giving you alcohol or drugs, but intercourse did not occur?’36
This question would certainly get a ‘yes’ from women given spiked punch at a fraternity party,
followed by an interrupted attempt at gang rape, but would also perhaps evince a positive reply
from a woman whose boyfriend (with whom she was already sleeping) made gentle attempts to
have sex with her at the end of an evening where he bought most of the drinks, but desisted when
asked. Remember, the woman is answering a questionnaire, not giving evidence at a police station.
There is some very limited evidence of men being victims of stranger rape by women, as defined
above. It would appear that the idea that men cannot maintain erection when threatened is false. The
victims of stranger rape by women apparently experience the same symptoms as female victims.37
They also face the ideological problem that it is assumed they have undergone an enjoyable
experience, that in most jurisdictions there is no legal category for their experience, and that they
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are not believed. Mary Koss argues that women cannot rape men because rape involves forced
penetration; the nearest offence she can think of is a group of women holding down a man and
penetrating him anally with carrots. This is not a frequent occurrence. More realistically she
imagines unethical conduct in which a woman induces a man to have sex with her by threatening to
spread rumors that he is impotent. Koss says that this would not be rape because the man is not
penetrated and is not threatened with force.38 By invoking ridicule and definition by fiat she thus
contributes to a version of the myths of rape, which she would rightly decry if applied to women.39
Koss's myths would be, roughly: i. women cannot force men to have sex because men faced with
force do not sustain erections; ii. men are not penetrated by women, therefore sex forced on a man
by a woman is not traumatic like rape. According to the above analysis in terms of denial of
autonomy and the creation of unhappiness, male victims of stranger rape by women suffer a serious
assault and probably deserve the same legal protection as female rape victims. The issue should be
seen as one of sexual assault, the seriousness of which is measured by establishing how unhappy a
typical male victim becomes. I would not regard a threat to spread rumors of impotence as very
coercive; other rumors, such as rumors of marital infidelity or of corruption at work could have
serious results and are at least as coercive as many of the examples of force (e.g. a slap) used by
Koss. Whether coerced sex of this sort should actually be called 'rape' or placed in some lesser
category of sexual assault should depend on how traumatic men typically find this form of coerced
sex.
More common is a male experience of unwanted heterosexual sex on a date or with a known
woman. Besides altruistic sex, where we can simply say that there is a category mistake because the
sex is consenting, male victims (or ‘victims’) have sex when they are too drunk to consent, and are
subjected to some degree of physical force or restraint, hence the conclusion above that 8% of men
in the survey quoted had been victims of rape on a date compared with 8.5% of the women in
Koss’s survey. The conclusions above on ‘rapettes’ apply even more forcefully here: the suggestion
in the survey is that men are less traumatized than women by heterosexual sex without consent, but
the evidence is extremely thin and there needs to be further investigation before conclusions are
drawn.
Conclusion
The scattergun approach of philosophers to stranger rape probably does not matter very much: there
is a widespread consensus, which I do not wish to challenge, that stranger rape is seriously
abhorrent. On the other hand, when we start to look at less serious incidents which are bracketed
with rape it becomes an important issue. Unless we are going to believe that most of the population
is seriously traumatized by various sexual assaults, some way is needed of distinguishing between
bad sex, minor assaults and major assaults. Alienation, violation of a right to control one’s own
body and violation of a domain are all too sweeping: a very serious sexual offence is either
triggered off by a particular action or it is not. This way of thinking seems to be tied up with
implausible distinctions which say that physically pushing someone in order to obtain sex is raping
her whilst threatening her with economic ruin is merely applying pressure. What I am suggesting as
a way forward is that there must be some violation of autonomy for something to count as a sexual
offence at all. This is to allow for the point that people may do all sorts of things for altruistic
motives. Given that there is a violation of autonomy, the other issue that decides between serious,
moderate and trivial offences is the degree of distress caused to the victim, to her or his intimates,
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and more widely to women in general or the society. Sexual offences are typically multi-
dimensional: there is a perceived level of threat, but the perception may be skewed; people’s
personal attitudes to both the sexual act desired and the threatened consequences of not going along
with it vary, as do the attitudes of different societies and different groups within them; the
participants may well be incapacitated by drink or drugs, but to what degree? It is thus unlikely that
a consensus could ever be reached about an exact hierarchy of the seriousness of offences, but my
approach does offer a rational handle on a very fraught area. From a philosophical, if not
necessarily a legal, perspective it points towards some sort of lesser crime of rape to cover instances
with a lower degree of coercion, or a rewriting of the law in terms of degrees of sexual assault.
Mark Cowling
University of Teesside
Notes
1. Two further issues, the exact identification of communications of consent and the question of
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